Atrocity Crimes Litigation: Some Human Rights Concerns Occasioned by Selected 2009 Case Law by Sluiter, Göran
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights
Volume 8 | Issue 3 Article 2
Summer 2010
Atrocity Crimes Litigation: Some Human Rights
Concerns Occasioned by Selected 2009 Case Law
Göran Sluiter
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Göran Sluiter, Atrocity Crimes Litigation: Some Human Rights Concerns Occasioned by Selected 2009 Case Law, 8 Nw. J. Int'l Hum. Rts.
248 (2010).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol8/iss3/2
Copyright 2010 by Northwestern University School of Law Volume 8, Issue 3 (Summer 2010) 
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 
 
 
Atrocity Crimes Litigation: 
Some Human Rights Concerns 




¶1 The year 2009 has been in many respects spectacular for 
international criminal justice. Looking back on each of the past ten 
to fifteen years one has the impression that it is hardly possible that 
more developments take place than in the previous year, but we are 
always proven wrong. It seems that each year tops the previous one 
in terms of creation of new institutions, abundance of case law and 
legislative efforts. This in spite of the fact that the big ad hoc 
tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (“ICTR”) have been engaged in their respective completion 
strategies for quite a few years.  But new experiments in 
international criminal justice, such as the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) and the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon (“STL”), and the growing body of jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) make up for any reduced 
(investigative) activity of the UN ad hoc Tribunals. 
¶2 A full overview of all interesting developments in the year 
2009 would by far exceed a reasonably sized paper. Furthermore, 
there exist excellent and more frequently appearing overviews of 
developments in international criminal justice, to which I gladly 
refer the interested reader.1 I have thus decided to make a selection. 
Guiding me in this selection are the problems in securing adequate 
protection of human rights in the international criminal justice 
system. We are increasingly encountering incidents and situations, 
                                                            
∗ Professor in the law of international criminal procedure. 
1 See, e.g., the ‘Highlights’ section in the Journal of International Criminal Justice 
and also the regular discussions of case law in the Leiden Journal of International 
Law. 




which seriously raise the question whether the strong interest in 
effective prosecution tends to override the minimum standards of 
due process.  
II. THE RIGHT TO BE TRIED WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY2 
¶3 It is known that the periods within which persons indicted by 
the ICTY and ICTR are tried are sometimes disconcertingly long. 
These periods run from the moment of arrest until finalization of all 
proceedings.3 While the ICTY has experienced its share of long 
proceedings,4 the most extreme cases can be found at the ICTR. 
After preceding case law where the ICTR Appeals Chamber had 
established that periods of approximately eight years did not amount 
to a violation of the right to be tried without undue delay,5 the ICTR 
Trial Chamber was confronted at the end of 2008 with the question 
                                                            
2 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. 
Res 827, Art. 21(4)(c), UN SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th Mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. 
S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Art. 20(4)(c), UN SCOR 49th Sess., 3453d Mtg., U.N. 
Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Art. 67(1)(c), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998); Statute of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, Art. 17(4)(c), U.N. Doc. S/2002/246, Appx. II (Jan. 16, 
2002). This right is protected by other international agreements as well.  
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 21, 
Art. 14(3)(c), U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 
1996);  European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 6(1), ETS 5 (Nov. 4, 1950); 
American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, Art. 8(1) 
(Nov. 11, 1969). 
3 See Kangasluoma v. Finland, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29, ¶ 26 (“the period to be 
taken into account in the assessment of the length of the proceedings starts from 
an official notification given to an individual by the competent authority of an 
allegation that he has committed a criminal offence or from some other act which 
carries the implication of such an allegation and which likewise substantially 
affects the situation of the suspect”). 
4 For example, the first accused at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), Dusko Tadić, was arrested in February 1994 in 
Germany, for crimes related to the Omarska camp. Proscutor v. Tadic, Case No. 
IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-Abis, ¶ 2 Judgement in Sentencing Appeals (January 26, 
2000).  The final judgement was issued approximately six years later.  Id.  It must 
be mentioned, however, that the period between his arrest and his first conviction 
was a little over three years.  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion 
and Judgement (May 7, 1997). 
5 Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶¶ 
1076-1077 (November 28, 2007). 
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whether the accused in Prosecutor v. Bagosora (“Military I”) 
received adequate protection from this right.6 The accused had 
suffered from eleven and twelve years of detention until their cases 
were decided in first instance; at present, they are all engaged in 
appeal proceedings and it cannot be said when the proceedings will 
be finalized and what the totality of the period ultimately will be. 
¶4 These aforementioned periods may seem unacceptable to 
every reasonable observer. Twelve years of trial duration and pre-
trial detention—in a context where the average life expectancy is 
54.1 years7—is absolutely shameful. As to the law, the reasoning 
proffered by the Trial Chamber is unconvincing and leaves the 
reader with the uncomfortable feeling that an upper limit for the 
duration of a trial may never be established at the international level. 
If twelve years won’t do it, maybe fifteen, maybe twenty; we simply 
do not know. The reasoning adopted by all ICTR Chambers makes 
maximum use of all the flexible variables included in the law on 
“trial without undue delay” in such a manner that any result can be 
justified. 
¶5 It may be necessary to set out the basic parameters under 
international human rights law to determine undue delay. No 
specific time-limit exists, and the reasonableness will clearly depend 
on the circumstances of the case, having regard to the complexity of 
the case, the conduct of the accused, and the conduct of the relevant 
authorities.8 The latter is in fact the most important factor.9 The 
highly flexible nature of this assessment has resulted in human 
rights case law where an apparently short duration produced a 
violation, whereas an apparently very long duration was regarded as 
lawful. The flexible nature of the right is further illustrated by the 
opportunity for states to avoid liability for a violation when the 
affected person is compensated for the excessive length, in the form 
of an adequate reduction of the sentence.10 
                                                            
6 See Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement (Dec. 18, 
2008). 
7 UN Data: Life Expectancy at Birth, Both Sexes Combined for Rawnda (2015-
2020), http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=PopDiv&f=variableID%3A68 (last visited 
June 20, 2010). 
8 See, e.g., Philis v. Greece, 1997 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34, ¶ 35.  See also Prosecutor v. 
Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, ICTR, Decision on the Defence Extremely 
Urgent Motion on Habeas Corpus and For Stoppage of Proceedings (May 23, 
2000) (adopting same criteria). 
9 STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 146 (2005). 
10 Id. at 148. 





¶6 The Trial Chamber in Military I committed at least four 
discernable errors in its treatment of the matter. 
¶7 First, it repeated the mistake made by the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber, which rejected a comparison with time frames in domestic 
criminal courts, because they were found “not particularly 
persuasive given the inherent complexity of international 
proceedings.”11 In its reasoning, the Trial Chamber did not refer to 
international human rights case law and resorted to a self-referential 
analysis, in which apparently it was a small step from eight years as 
reasonable to twelve years as reasonable. What one expects from the 
Chamber is an application of human rights law as minimum 
standards to the situation at hand. Clearly, the complexity of 
proceedings can serve to prolong the duration of the reasonable 
period, but this must be properly explained and certainly complexity 
can never serve to justify delays ad infinitum. 
¶8 Second, it follows from the Chamber’s reasoning that in 
determining the period as reasonable the complexity of the 
proceedings was a decisive consideration.12 Interestingly, the 
complexity of proceedings is dealt with as a given, for which 
apparently no one is to blame. This is naive and wrong.  The 
Prosecutor can be held responsible in two ways for trials of extreme 
duration. At the beginning, he carries significant responsibility for 
delays by submitting indictments in a system that is incapable of 
handling them within a reasonable period of time. Furthermore, the 
complexity of prosecutions is the direct result of prosecutorial 
choices, namely the selection of charges. 
¶9 Third, if the delay cannot be attributed to a specific party, as 
the Trial Chamber in Military I established,13 this cannot be a 
ground to ignore violations of individual rights. As ruled in 
Barayagwiza, sharing of fault between organs of the tribunal should 
not affect the application of fundamental rights.14  
                                                            
11 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement, ¶ 80 (citing 
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶¶ 1076-
77 (Nov. 28, 2007)). 
12 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 78 – 82. 
13 Id. ¶ 82. 
14 Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, ¶ 73 (Nov. 
1999). 
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¶10 Fourth, the Trial Chamber made the puzzling finding that 
they could not identify any prejudice caused by the delay with 
respect to the two accused who received life sentences.15 This is 
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and the principle 
that the reasonable duration of the trial must be assessed 
independently. Furthermore, it is a mistake to find that the accused 
suffered no prejudice; they clearly did, as they had to wait eleven 
and twelve years before knowing the (provisional) outcome of their 
case. 
¶11 The Trial Chamber’s decision on the duration of the trial 
does a disservice to proper respect of human rights norms. It ignores 
the function of the ICTR as a role model for criminal proceedings 
and creates the risk that national courts can justify lengthy 
proceedings by referring to the practice of the ICTR. It is my view 
that a violation of the right had to be established; at the very least, a 
proper analysis had to be conducted, indicating what the reasonable 
limits for the duration of trials are. The Trial Chamber could have 
easily expressed its discomfort and could have determined that a 
violation of the right to be tried without undue delay had occurred, 
without this having to have far-reaching consequences. Remedies 
could have been confined to an appropriate reduction of the sentence 
imposed. 
III. THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 
¶12 The ICTY Appeals Chamber pronounced its judgment in the 
Krajišnik case on March 17, 2009; the accused was sentenced to 
twenty years of imprisonment.16 An important element of the 
appeals was the accused’s claim that he received ineffective 
representation for a very large part of the trial proceedings, which 
allegedly violated his fair trial rights.17 It was not the first time the 
Appeals Chamber was confronted with claims of ineffective 
representation by counsel. It happened in the cases of Tadić,18 
                                                            
15 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement, ¶ 83. 
16 See Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgement, (Mar. 17, 2009). 
17 Id. ¶ 395. 
18 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Appellant's Motion 
for the Extension of the Time-Limit and Admission of Additional Evidence, (Oct. 
15, 1998); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-R, Decision on Motion for 
Review (July 30, 2002). 





Akayesu,19 and Blagojević.20 The applicable test for ineffective 
representation was set out in Akayesu: 
77. With respect to the applicable tests for assessing counsel’s 
ineptitude, the Appeals Chamber endorses the tests applied by 
ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić Decision. In this regard, 
ICTY Appeals Chamber held that an Appellant alleging 
incompetence of counsel must show the “gross incompetence” 
of the latter. The Appellant may do so by “demonstrat[ing] that 
there was reasonable doubt as to whether a miscarriage of 
justice resulted.” Indeed, “(..)when evidence was not called 
because of the advice of the defence counsel in charge at the 
time, it cannot be right for the Appeals Chamber to admit 
additional evidence in such a case, even if it were to disagree 
with the advice given by counsel. The unity of identity between 
client and counsel is indispensable to the workings of the 
International Criminal Tribunal.  If counsel acted despite the 
wishes of the Appellant, in the absence of protest at the time, 
and barring special circumstances which do not appear, the 
latter must be taken to have acquiesced …” 
 
78. In other words, the Statute of the Tribunal affords an 
indigent accused the right to be represented by a competent 
counsel.  The latter is presumed to be competent and such a 
presumption of competence can only be rebutted by evidence to 
the contrary.  In most cases, the accused would have to show 
prejudice as set out in the above-mentioned Tadić Decision and 
should such prejudice be proven, the Appeals Chamber would 
have to acknowledge that the right of the Accused as guaranteed 
under the Statute had been violated.  However, even if such 
prejudice is not proven the question remains, as to whether the 
proven incompetence constitutes a violation of the statutory 
right of the accused to assistance by competent counsel and 
would consequently warrant a remedy.21 (footnotes omitted)  
¶13 The combined standard of “gross incompetence” and on that 
basis “demonstrat[ing] that there was reasonable doubt as to whether 
a miscarriage of justice resulted” seems quite high and 
unreasonable, for at least two reasons. First, lying at the foundation 
of this test is the assumption of competent counsel. But lacking 
                                                            
19 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgement (June 1, 2001). 
20 Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, A. Ch., Judgement 
(May 9, 2007). 
21 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 77-8 
(June 1, 2001). 
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proper selection and training mechanisms, to mention just two, the 
ICTY and ICTR simply cannot guarantee competence of counsel to 
the same degree as a well-functioning domestic criminal justice 
system. Second, it has never been properly explored by the ICTY 
and ICTR how their standard relates to human rights law and 
standards developed in adversarial criminal justice systems. The 
adversarial-based standard, employed in such states as the United 
States, is relevant to the ICTY and ICTR, which by and large 
follows an adversarial procedural system. 
¶14 In international human rights law we are confronted with two 
slightly diverging standards. In the context of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) national authorities only 
have to intervene “if a failure by legal aid counsel to provide 
effective representation is manifest or sufficiently brought to their 
attention in some other way.”22 “Manifest ineffective 
representation” is not easily established, as counsel acting against 
the wishes of his client is not necessarily considered to be 
ineffective.23 In death penalty cases—which concerns the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)—a 
more demanding standard has been adopted; the state has a positive 
duty to ensure that the legal assistance provided is effective.24 
¶15 At the national level, it is worth referring to U.S. case law. In 
the United States, according to Strickland v. Washington, the 
“proper standard for [measuring] attorney performance is that of 
reasonably effective assistance” as guided by “prevailing 
professional norms” and consideration of “all the circumstances” 
relevant to counsel’s performance.25 
                                                            
 22Kamasinski v. Austria, App. No. 9783/82, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 65 
(1989) (available at http://www.echr.coe/int/eng).   
23 Id. ¶ 70.  
24 Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Art. 5, Para. 4 of the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Jam., July 15, 
1996, CCPR/C/57/D/537/1993. See Kelly v. Jamaica, Communication 537/1993, 
Views adopted on 17 July 1996, UN Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/537/1993 and 
Communication No. 355/1989, Views adopted on 8 July 1994, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/51/D/355/1989 (1994). 
25 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The major conclusions of that 
landmark decision concerning effective representation can be summarized as 
follows:  
(a) to establish ineffective assistance requiring reversal of a conviction, a 
defendant must show both  





¶16 The problem with all ICTY and ICTR case law in respect to 
the right to effective representation, as an essential ingredient of the 
right to a fair trial, is that its own standard has never been explained 
or justified in light of human rights case law and relevant national 
case law (i.e. case law in adversarial criminal justice systems). The 
international jurisprudence is, again, highly self-referential. It is my 
view that the standard of effective representation developed and 
applied by the ICTY and ICTR is too high in relation to other 
relevant standards, especially given that the ICTY and ICTR offer 
no credible guarantees for the assumption of competence. Although 
the death penalty is not an available punishment in international 
criminal justice, all cases deal with extremely serious accusations, 
which may lead to the most serious penalties. Under these 
circumstances, it seems logical to adopt the ICCPR standard 
applicable to death penalty-cases, namely the positive duty 
incumbent upon the ICTY to ensure that legal assistance is effective. 
Simply too much is at stake. 
¶17 The problems in respect of finding an appropriate standard 
are very well illustrated by the Krajišnik case. Interestingly, the 
Appeals Chamber went some way in agreeing with Krajišnik that 
the assistance he received from counsel was ineffective. It 
acknowledged that the work product handed over from the first to 
second counsel “was not in as good a state as it should have been,”26 
that there was insufficient preparation of the Defence team at the 
beginning of the trial,27 and that the Defence’s review of the 
                                                                                                                                        
(i) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and 
(ii) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense;  
(b) the ‘proper standard for [measuring] attorney performance is that of 
reasonably effective assistance’, as guided by ‘prevailing professional 
norms’ and consideration of ‘all the circumstances’ relevant to counsel’s 
performance;  
(c) more specific guidelines in applying that standard are not appropriate; 
and  
(d) the proper standard for measuring prejudice is whether there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceedings would be different. WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, (3rd Ed. 2007) at 635 (For a detailed analysis of 
the law concerning ineffective representation see 635–46). 
26 Krajišnik, Judgement, supra note 16, ¶ 47. 
27 Id. ¶ 54. 
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disclosure material was imperfect.28 Throughout its analysis the 
Appeals Chamber ruled that no gross negligence was established 
and/or no miscarriage of justice occurred. It failed, however, to 
substantiate those findings. It would be particularly interesting to 
learn what type of ineffective representation would amount to gross 
negligence and would occasion a miscarriage of justice. Indeed, the 
observer is left with the impression that Krajišnik has suffered 
significant prejudice from ineffective representation. What is more, 
the Appeals Chamber deals with instances of ineffective 
representation separately, but does not consider properly their 
combined effect.  
¶18 One cannot help wondering whether the completion strategy 
has anything to do with dismissal of what appears a fairly solid and 
legitimate appellate ground. Clearly, in case of acceptance, a new 
trial would be necessary, causing serious delay. The concerns 
expressed by Judge Hunt in relation to effects of the completion 
strategy are worth citing: 
21. The international community has entrusted the Tribunal with 
the task of trying persons charged with serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. It expects the Tribunal to do so 
in accordance with those rights of the accused to which 
reference is made in the previous paragraph. If the Tribunal is 
not given sufficient time and money to do so by the international 
community, then it should not attempt to try those persons in a 
way which does not accord with those rights. In my opinion, it 
is improper to take the Completion Strategy into account in 
departing from interpretations which had earlier been accepted 
by the Appeals Chamber where this is at the expense of those 
rights.  
 
22. This Tribunal will not be judged by the number of 
convictions which it enters, or by the speed with which it 
concludes the Completion Strategy which the Security Council 
has endorsed, but by the fairness of its trials. The Majority 
Appeals Chamber Decision and others in which the Completion 
Strategy has been given priority over the rights of the accused 
will leave a spreading stain on this Tribunal’s reputation.29 
                                                            
28 Id. ¶ 63. 
29 ICTY, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Admissibility of Evidence-
In-Chief in the Form of Written Statements, Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-
02-54-AR73.4, A. Ch. (October 21 2003), ¶¶ 21, 22. 





IV. “FIGHTING IMPUNITY” AS AN INTERPRETATIVE TOOL OF SOURCES 
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
¶19 In 2009 we have seen two ICC Appeals Chamber decisions 
which reveal a dangerous trend in interpretative methodology of key 
instruments of international criminal justice, i.e. statutes of 
international criminal tribunals. As I will demonstrate below, the 
aim of international criminal tribunals to put an end to impunity has 
been attributed a prominent place in the interpretation of statutes and 
other relevant sources of international criminal law. Indeed, the 
object and purpose of statutes, applying the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, are important factors in getting to the correct 
interpretation of provisions.30 But if the fight against impunity is 
taking on an important dimension in interpretative questions, one 
can easily imagine that interpretations in favour of effective 
prosecution loom on the horizon. This will especially be the case 
when interpretative rules used in criminal justice, such as the rule of 
lenity and the maxim in dubio pro reo which favour the accused, are 
insufficiently taken into account to counterbalance a predisposition 
towards effective prosecution.  
¶20 There is an increasing concern of a significant pro-
prosecution bias in international criminal justice. Darryl Robinson 
has offered highly interesting observations about how this can be 
explained: 
In a typical criminal law context, liberal sensitivities focus on 
constraining the use of the state’s coercive power against 
individuals. In ICL, however, prosecution and conviction are 
often conceptualized as the fulfilment of the victims’ human 
right to a remedy. Such a conceptualization encourages reliance 
on human rights methodology and norms. This shift in 
conceptualization also shifts the preoccupation of participants in 
the system. Many traditionally liberal actors (such as non-
governmental organizations or academics),who in a national 
system would vigilantly protect defendants and potential 
defendants, are among the most strident pro-prosecution voices, 
arguing for broad definitions and modes of liability and for 
                                                            
30 The cardinal rule of treaty interpretation is set out in Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties:  “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in light of its object and purpose.”  Vienna Convention on the 
Laws of Treaties, May 23, 1969 art. 31(1) 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.   
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narrow defences, in order to secure convictions and thereby 
fulfil the victim’s right to justice. Whereas in a national system 
one may hear that it is preferable to let ten guilty persons go free 
rather than to convict one innocent person, the ICL literature 
seems to strike the balance rather differently, replete as it is with 
fears that defendants might “escape conviction” or “escape 
accountability” unless inculpating principles are broadened 
further and exculpatory principles narrowed.31 (footnotes 
omitted) 
¶21 While the pro-prosecution bias can thus be explained, a 
mature justice system requires that judges take care in resisting such 
temptation. In the interpretation and application of the law they thus 
have to refrain from using a methodology that is clearly the result of 
and strengthens such bias. 
¶22 The first decision revealing a pro-prosecution biased 
interpretation is the Appeals Chamber’s ruling on Katanga’s 
admissibility challenge.32 In determining the proper interpretation of 
Article 17(1) of the ICC Statute—how it relates to situations of 
inaction—the Appeals Chamber used the fifth and fourth paragraphs 
of the Rome Statute as a basis for a “purposive interpretation” of the 
Statute.33 This purposive interpretation did not seem to produce 
direct negative results for the accused, because the matter was 
concerned with adequate division of cases among the ICC and 
national justice systems. But one can easily imagine how the 
emphasis on ending impunity can result in interpretations prejudicial 
to the accused. 
¶23 An example where this could have taken place is the Appeals 
Chamber’s decision on Regulation 55. On December 8, 2009, the 
ICC Appeals Chamber issued its judgement on the changes to the 
legal characterisation of the facts—pursuant to Regulation 55 (2)—
                                                            
31 Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN 
J. OF INT’L L.  925, 930-931 (2008). 
32 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/07 OA 8, Judgement on the Appeal of Germain Katanga against the Oral 
Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case 
(2009). 
33 Id. ¶ 79. 





in the Lubanga case.34 Regarding the interpretations of Article 61(9) 
of the Statute and Regulation 55,35 the Appeals Chamber stated: 
 
The Appeals Chamber is not persuaded by the interpretation of 
article 61(9) of the Statute put forward by Mr Lubanga Dyilo. 
First, the Appeals Chamber recalls that article 61(9) addresses 
primarily the powers of the Prosecutor to seek an amendment, 
addition or substitution of the charges, at his or her own 
initiative and prior to the commencement of the trial; the terms 
of the provision do not exclude the possibility that a Trial 
Chamber modifies the legal characterisation of the facts on its 
                                                            
34 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, Decision giving 
notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterization of the facts 
may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations 
of the Court, (July 14, 2009) (hereinafter Lubanga Judgement). 
35 These provisions read as follows:  
Article 61 (9): After the charges are confirmed and before the trial has begun, the 
Prosecutor may,with the permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber and after notice to 
the accused, amend the charges. If the Prosecutor seeks to add additional charges 
or to substitute more serious charges, a hearing under this article to confirm those 
charges must be held. After commencement of the trial, the Prosecutor may, with 
the permission of the Trial Chamber, withdraw the charges. 
Regulation 55: 1. In its decision under article 74, the Chamber may change the 
legal characterisation of facts to accord with the crimes under articles 6, 7 or 8, or 
to accord with the form of participation of the accused under articles 25 and 28, 
without exceeding the facts and circumstances described in the charges and any 
amendments to the charges. 
2. If, at any time during the trial, it appears to the Chamber that the legal 
characterisation of facts may be subject to change, the Chamber shall give notice 
to the participants of such a possibility and having heard the evidence, shall, at an 
appropriate stage of the proceedings, give the participants the opportunity to make 
oral or written submissions. The Chamber may suspend the hearing to ensure that 
the participants have adequate time and facilities for effective preparation or, if 
necessary, it may order a hearing to consider all matters relevant to the proposed 
change. 
3. For the purposes of sub-regulation 2, the Chamber shall, in particular, ensure 
that the accused shall: 
(a) Have adequate time and facilities for the effective preparation of his 
or her defence in accordance with article 67, paragraph 1 (b); and 
(b) If necessary, be given the opportunity to examine again, or have 
examined again, a previous witness, to call a new witness or to present other 
evidence admissible under the Statute in accordance with article 67, paragraph 1 
(e). Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M 1002 (1998), 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
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own motion once the trial has commenced. Regulation 55 fits 
within the procedural framework because at the confirmation 
hearing, the Prosecutor needs only to "support each charge with 
sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe," 
whereas during trial, the onus is on the Prosecutor to prove 
"guilt beyond reasonable doubt." Thus, in the Appeals 
Chamber's view, article 61(9) of the Statute and Regulation 55 
address different powers of different entities at different stages 
of the procedure, and the two provisions are therefore not 
inherently incompatible. Second, the Appeals Chamber notes 
that Mr Lubanga Dyilo's interpretation of article 61(9) of the 
Statute bears the risk of acquittals that are merely the result of 
legal qualifications confirmed in the pre-trial phase that turn out 
to be incorrect, in particular based on the evidence presented at 
the trial. This would be contrary to the aim of the Statute to "put 
an end to impunity" (fifth paragraph of the Preamble). The 
Appeals Chamber is of the view that a principal purpose of 
Regulation 55 is to close accountability gaps, a purpose that is 
fully consistent with the Statute.36 (footnotes omitted) 
¶24 The result of the proceedings on appeal was favourable to 
the accused, as the Trial Chamber’s interpretation of Regulation 55, 
allowing it to add new facts and circumstances not described in the 
charges, was ruled to be incompatible with Article 61(9) of the 
Statute. But this does not alter the fact that in its interpretation of the 
Statute the Appeals Chamber referred to “risks of acquittal” and 
again uses the fight against impunity as an important interpretative 
tool. This is an accident waiting to happen. Once this sets in as “firm 
case law,” it is open to Chambers to use vague connotations like the 
fight against impunity to creatively mould the Statute. I propose that 
these preambular sections, which explain and underlie the creation 
of the ICC, no longer receive interpretative importance. Rather, it is 
recommended that “delivering justice” guides the Chambers in their 
interpretation of the Statute. Unfortunate references to “risks of 
acquittals” are less likely to be reproduced when the neutral object 
and purpose of “delivering justice” replaces the “fight against 
impunity.”  
V. PERSISTING PROBLEMS IN SECURING THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY 
¶25 One of the weakest aspects in terms of human rights law in 
the functioning of international criminal tribunals is the right to 
liberty.  The law of the ICTY and ICTR has been defective for a 
                                                            
36 Lubanga, Judgement, supra note 34, ¶ 77.  





long time and still is. Rule 65 (B) of these Tribunals stipulated for a 
considerable number of years that “[r]elease may be ordered by a 
Trial Chamber only in exceptional circumstances…,” turning human 
rights law on its head, according to which liberty is the rule and 
detention the exception.37 The Rule was amended for the ICTY in 
1999 and has removed the reference to exceptional circumstances. 
Still, the law is flawed. Rule 65 deals with provisional release and 
puts the burden of proof in these applications on the defendant. It 
takes detention thus as the starting point. In the Statute and Rules 
there are no conditions for the issuance of warrants for arrest and 
detention, except that sufficient evidence exists.38 Thus, the 
Prosecutor does not have to prove any grounds justifying detention, 
such as the risk of flight. Rather, the burden of proof lies with the 
defendant, in the context of an application for provisional release, to 
satisfy the Chamber that he will appear for trial and, if released, will 
not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person. This 
reversal of the burden—viewed in the absence of initial 
determination that grounds justifying arrest exist39—violates human 
rights law. From the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights it follows that a person charged with an offence must always 
                                                            
37 Article 9(3) of the ICCPR stipulates that it shall not be the general rule that 
persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody. See on that provision General 
Comment 08 (16) of the Human Rights Committee (A/37/40 (1982) Annex V (at 
95–6): “Pre-trial detention should be an exception and as short as possible.”  
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171; S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978); S. Treaty Doc. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). 
38 Article 19 of the ICTY Statute governs this procedure: 
1. The judge of the Trial Chamber to whom the indictment has been 
transmitted shall review it. If satisfied that a prima facie case has been 
established by the Prosecutor, he shall confirm the indictment. If not so 
satisfied, the indictment shall be dismissed.  
2. Upon confirmation of an indictment, the judge may, at the request of 
the Prosecutor, issue such orders and warrants for the arrest, detention, 
surrender or transfer of persons, and any other orders as may be required 
for the conduct of the trial.  S.C. Res. 808, ¶ 98, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 
(May 3, 1993).   
39 The following grounds are recognized justifications for detention in  case law 
from the European Court of Human Rights: the risk that the accused will fail to 
appear for trial; the risk that the accused would take action to prejudice the 
administration of justice or commit further offences or cause public disorder; and 
the risk that release may give rise, by reason of the particular gravity of the 
accusations and public reaction to them, to a social disturbance. Letellier v. 
France, App. No. 12369/86 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. ¶ 35 (1991). 
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be released pending trial unless the state can show that there are 
relevant and sufficient reasons to justify continued detention.40 
¶26 The law of the ICC is a strong improvement compared to the 
law of the ICTY and ICTR on habeas corpus. At least two elements 
must be mentioned. First, contrary to the law of the ICTY and ICTR, 
the ICC Statute puts the burden of proof on the Prosecutor to not 
only satisfy the Chamber that there exists sufficient evidence 
justifying arrest and detention, but also that the arrest appears 
necessary for specific reasons.41 Second, the ICC Statute contains 
better safeguards for periodical review of detention and for ensuring 
that a person is not detained for an unreasonable period prior to 
trial.42 
¶27 In light of this improved system it seems logical that the 
issue of almost automatic pre-trial detention is approached more 
critically by ICC Chambers. Indeed, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, 
acting through Single Judge Trendafilova, decided in the Bemba 
                                                            
40 Smirnova v. Russia, App. No. 46133/99 and 48183/99 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. 
& Rep., ¶ 59  (2003). 
41 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 58(1) (“At any time 
after the initiation of an investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the 
application of the Prosecutor, issue a warrant of arrest of a person if, having 
examined the application and the evidence or other information submitted by the 
Prosecutor, it is satisfied that: 
(a) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has 
committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and 
(b) The arrest of the person appears necessary: 
(i) To ensure the person's appearance at trial; 
(ii) To ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the 
investigation or the court proceedings; or 
(iii) Where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing 
with the commission of that crime or a related crime which is 
within the jurisdiction of the Court and which arises out of the 
same circumstances”). 
42 Id. art. 60 (3)- (4) (“3. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall periodically review its 
ruling on the release or detention of the person, and may do so at any time on the 
request of the Prosecutor or the person. Upon such review, it may modify its 
ruling as to detention, release or conditions of release, if it is satisfied that changed 
circumstances so require. 
4. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall ensure that a person is not detained for an 
unreasonable period prior to trial due to inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor. If 
such delay occurs, the Court shall consider releasing the person, with or without 
conditions”). 





case that the defendant should be conditionally released.43 The 
Decision paid proper respect to applicable human rights law: 
35. The Single Judge wishes to recall that article 60(3) of the 
Statute, as any other statutory provision, must be interpreted and 
applied in accordance with internationally recognized human 
rights, as provided for in article 21(3) of the Statute. The right of 
an arrested person to have access to a judicial authority vested 
with the power to adjudicate upon the lawfulness and 
justification of his or her detention is enshrined in many 
international human rights instruments, such as article 9 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 9 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 5 of 
the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, article 6 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights and article 7 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights. 
 
36. The Single Judge further recalls the 14 April 2009 Decision 
in which she stressed that "when dealing with the right to 
liberty, one should be mindful of the fundamental principle that 
deprivation of liberty should be an exception and not a rule 
(emphasis added). 
 
37. The Single Judge wishes to clarify that this fundamental 
principle, a corollary of the presumption of innocence provided 
in article 66 of the Statute, continues to be the guiding principle 
upon which the present review is based. 
38. The Single Judge also emphasizes that pre-trial detention is 
not to be considered as pre-trial punishment and shall not be 
used for punitive purposes. The Single Judge's task is to weigh 
up and balance the factors presented to her, mindful of the 
particular circumstances of each individual case.44 (footnotes 
omitted) 
¶28 In a principled, and in my view correct, approach to 
detention on remand, the Single Judge decided on the examination 
                                                            
43 Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. 
Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-475, Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo and Convening Hearings with the Kingdom of Belgium, the 
Republic of Portugal, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the Italian Republic, and the Republic of South Africa (Aug. 14,  2009) 
[hereinafter Bemba Decision]. 
44 Id. ¶¶ 35-38. 
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of the facts that the detention of Mr. Bemba appeared no longer 
necessary: 
In conclusion, the Single Judge holds that the continued 
detention of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba does not appear necessary 
to ensure his appearance at trial in accordance with article 
58(l)(b)(i) of the Statute. The Single Judge also concludes that 
the continued detention is not necessitated by the other two 
alternatives encapsulated in article 58(l)(b)(ii) and (iii) of the 
Statute. Recalling that the decision on continued detention or 
release is not of a discretionary nature, and mindful of the 
underlying principle that deprivation of liberty is the exception 
and not the rule, the Single Judge decides that Mr. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba shall therefore be released, albeit under conditions.45 
¶29 But the Single Judge determined “that the implementation of 
this decision is deferred pending a decision by the Chamber on the 
set of conditions to be imposed on Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba, the state 
to which he is to be released and all necessary arrangements have 
been put in place.”46  
¶30 The decision from the Single Judge was overturned by the 
Appeals Chamber.47 Its judgement demonstrates that international 
criminal tribunals, in spite of improvements in the applicable law, 
still fail to come to grips with the right to liberty. The following 
flaws taint the judgement: 
¶31 First, contrary to the Single Judge, the Appeals Chamber 
does not seem to address this issue in light of the superior position 
of human rights law in the Court’s applicable law, as set out in 
Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute. No reference is made to the 
essential principles of the right to liberty or human rights (case) law. 
¶32 Second, one notices that the Appeals Chamber attributes 
significant importance to the “… length of sentence that Mr. Bemba 
is likely to serve if convicted on these charges …” as an incentive 
for him to abscond.48 Such considerations are inappropriate. They 
                                                            
45 Id. ¶ 77. 
46 Id. ¶ 78. 
47 The Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. 
Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-631 OA 2, Judgement on the appeal of the Prosecutor 
against Pre-Trial Chamber II's  “Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo and Convening Hearings with the Kingdom of Belgium, the 
Republic of Portugal, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the Italian Republic, and the Republic of South Africa” (Dec. 2, 2009)[hereinafter 
Bemba Judgement]. 
48 Id. ¶ 70. 





are inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and may unduly 
influence trial judges in the determination of the sentence. 
Furthermore, it is firmly established in human rights case law that 
pre-trial detention cannot be based on anticipation of a lengthy 
sentence of imprisonment.49 
¶33 Third, the Appeals Chamber is on a wrong and dangerous 
track when it imposes as a condition for a decision granting interim 
release the prior identification of a state that is willing and able to 
accept the person concerned.50 It did not elaborate on this and did 
not, for example, explain the meaning of “able and willing.” It 
seems to follow from reference to dependence upon state 
cooperation that the Appeals Chamber regards this as a non-
mandatory form of cooperation.51 As a result, the compliance with 
fundamental human rights norms in the functioning of the ICC is 
made completely dependent upon whether or not a state agrees to 
accept a person who is eligible for release. The respect of 
fundamental human rights norms cannot be made conditional upon 
such highly uncertain factors. The Appeals Chamber does not 
embark upon an analysis of the inevitable consequences of this 
position; should we infer from this finding that even in the most 
serious violations of the right to liberty a person will not be released 
if not accepted by a state? The Single Judge adopted a better 
approach: 
The Single Judge emphasizes that the decision on interim 
release ultimately rests with the Single Judge, who is mandated 
to examine the prerequisites for any deprivation of liberty, based 
on the law exclusively and the specific circumstances of the 
case. The fact that States may have not provided guarantees 
cannot weigh heavily against Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba's release. 
Neither are conditions of "guarantees" proposed by the States a 
prior indispensable requirement for granting interim release; 
rather they provide assurance to the Single Judge.52  
¶34 What is missing in both instances, but especially in the 
Appeals Chamber decision, is an adequate analysis of and answer to 
the questions of whether and how State Parties must cooperate with 
                                                            
49 Letellier v. France, 207 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)  ¶ 35 (1991). 
50 See Bemba Judgement, supra note 47, ¶ 106. 
51 See id. ¶ 107. 
52 Bemba Decision, supra note 43, ¶ 88 (internal citations omitted). 
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the Court in ensuring protection of the right to liberty. The Single 
Judge emphasized the existence of the duty to cooperate for State 
Parties set out in Part 9, with Article 86 as the general provision, and 
also rightly mentioned that this duty concerns the entire Statute, 
including Part 5.53 But with the hearing on implementation of the 
decision still to be held, the Single Judge did not determine the 
existence of a duty for (certain) states to cooperate in the interim 
release of Mr. Bemba. The Appeals Chamber, regrettably, refrained 
from any reference to Part 9; we can conclude, as was already 
mentioned, that it does not consider assistance in the protection of 
the right to liberty to fall within the ambit of the ICC’s cooperation 
regime. This follows, among other things, from the importance 
attached by the Appeals Chamber to Rule 119(3), obliging the 
Chamber to seek the views of relevant states before conditional 
release is ordered.54 But it is a non-sequitur, when the Appeals 
Chamber infers from this procedural obligation that a “willing State” 
must be identified prior to a decision on conditional release.55 There 
is no basis for this interpretation provided and, painfully, it is not put 
into the proper context of duties of states under Part 9. 
¶35 It is my view that Part 9 should not be restricted to effective 
assistance in investigations and prosecutions. Such emphasis, again, 
creates the risk of pro-prosecution bias. The duty of states to 
cooperate includes all matters related to investigations and 
prosecutions, especially when non-cooperation entails the violation 
of human rights. This interpretation of Article 86—and other 
Articles in Part 9—is not only preferable, it is also obligatory 
pursuant to Article 21(3) of the Statute. Furthermore, the specific 
situation of assisting in interim release is governed by Article 93. 
The chapeau of Article 93(1) makes reference to “assistance in 
relation to investigations or prosecutions.”56 There can be no doubt 
that assistance in respect of Bemba’s interim release is related to the 
Court’s prosecution. It must be acknowledged that assistance in 
release is not specifically provided for in Article 93, and therefore 
has to be accommodated under the residual clause, Article 93(1)(l).57 
                                                            
53 Id. ¶¶ 85-86. 
54 See Bemba Judgement, supra note 47, ¶ 106. 
55 Id. 
56 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 93 (emphasis added). 
57 Id. art. 93(1)(l) (“Any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the 
law of the requested State, with a view to facilitating the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court”). 





Although this provision refers to “facilitating the investigation and 
prosecution,” an interpretation in light of the obligation set out in 
Article 21(3) can have no other result than that State Parties must 
cooperate with the Court in ensuring the right to liberty. 
¶36 From a practical perspective, the question arises as to which 
state should be targeted with this obligation. Especially when the 
state of arrest or residence is not an obvious choice, because of 
political instability or inability to supervise conditions of detention, 
alternatives have to be considered. One of these alternatives could 
be the state party where (direct) relatives reside. A few words need 
to be said about the role of the host state, the Netherlands, in 
assisting international criminal tribunals in protecting the right to 
liberty. The host state has shown persistent reluctance in accepting 
conditionally released individuals on its territory.58 Regrettably, it 
has never offered its services to ensure proper protection of the right 
to liberty by institutions functioning on Dutch territory. But it needs 
to be borne in mind that Article 5 of the ECHR and Article 9 of the 
ICCPR impose obligations on the Netherlands, which, at a very 
minimum, require it to engage constructively with the ICC in 
ensuring the protection of the right to liberty of individuals present 
on Dutch territory. 
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
¶37 We have witnessed many spectacular developments in 
international criminal justice in 2009. In this contribution I have 
selected the developments that should give rise to concern. Based on 
a number of decisions in 2009, human rights protection remains the 
Achilles heel of international criminal justice. The trend remains 
undeniably pro-prosecution, both in respect of the interpretation of 
the law in general, and in respect of concrete human rights. For a 
system that should be growing in maturity it is disappointing that 
this trend is so tenacious and that little progress seems to be made. 
Maybe this is because the pro-prosecution bias is so much at the 
heart of the international criminal justice system. To improve this, 
                                                            
58 In respect to the ICTY, the host State has expressed regular concern that the 
provisionally-released accused lacks an adequate residence permit for the 
Netherlands. See JOHN R.W.D. JONES & STEVEN POWLES, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL PRACTICE 609-10 (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers 2003). 
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and to preserve the legitimacy of the international criminal justice 
system in the long run, I have three concrete recommendations. 
¶38 First, the “fight against impunity” or “closing the impunity 
gap” must be abolished or severely restricted as an interpretive tool. 
Instead, delivering justice should guide judges in their interpretation 
of the law. 
¶39 Second, international criminal tribunals must take human 
rights seriously. This implies that the law and case law of 
international human rights courts must be followed. Any deviation 
must be exceptional and based on convincing arguments. 
Furthermore, such deviation cannot, by definition, result in less 
protection. 
¶40 Third and finally, it is worth seriously exploring the 
possibility of external supervision of international criminal tribunals 
for their compliance with human rights law. For any justice system, 
including the international criminal justice system, however perfect 
it may be, external checks, with the necessary distance, are vital. 
  
